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(to borrow a phrase from Karl
Llewellyn) are living through the "second explosion" ofin
terest and activity in the empirical study oflegal institutions
and processes. It cannot fairly be said that the philanthropic
foundations have supplied the spark for the detonation; but
they certainly have provided a lot of the power. Explo

We in the law schools

sions, if uncontrolled, can be destructive. But it is not my
purpose, in this brief note, to inquire into the myriad prob
lems that have followed in the wake of recently launched
programs of institutional research. Rather, for the purposes

hand, I shall assume that these difficulties can and will be
resolved, that project research will be domesticated with
at

reasonable
trinal

success,

and that programs of other-than-doc

inquiry will become accepted as a normal and impor

part of the institutional functions of many law schools.
I shall, on these assumptions, confine myself to the consider
ation of one small, but perhaps neglected, aspect of the
tant

How can the utility of such research be
realized?
It would certainly be a gross error to assert that, in the
movement toward empirical studies oflegal institutions, no
significant thought has been given to the role of historical
research. If one turns to the Summary of Studies in Legal
Education, issued by the Columbia law faculty in 1928
(which occupies a place somewhere near the center of the
"first explosion"), he will discover frequent references to
historical studies, in connection with both curriculum mat
ters and research. Indeed, one of the objectives, stated in the
Summary is "to lay the basis for more serious study oflegal
history than has hitherto been contemplated in this coun
try." Everyone knows that highly important historical
scholarship was inspired by the Columbia studies and by

broad

most

question:

fully

of similar orientation elsewhere. And yet, conced
all
this, it is probably fair to say that the movement to
ing
ward empirical research in the law has not been strongly
characterized by consistent interest and concern with his

thought

to non-doctrinal inquiry
felt
a
have,
stronger affinity with the sociologist,
general,
the economist, and the psychologist than with the historian
and his discipline. The truth is that some of those who, in
the last generation, struck the match to the "first explo
sion" were not only uninterested in, but were inclined to
doubt the value of, historical studies, both in and out of the
law. And this unconcern, if not hostility, is probably char

torical studies. Those attracted
in

good many who have become active in the
contemporary phase of the movement.
It is not hard to advance partial explanations for this situ
ation. One reason undoubtedly lies in the character of much
historical research in the closing years of the last century.

acteristic
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History has been written in response to a variety of motiva
tions and to serve a variety of purposes. Certainly, many of
"the Historical School" often

employed history as an in
strument oflegal conservatism. It was not entirely without
reason that some who
pioneered in the application of em
pirical technique to the study of legal processes recognized
in the legal historian their natural enemy. Perhaps more fun.damentally, it is matter of temperament. An urge to dis
turb the dusts of the past and a desire to apply empirical
technique to contemporary issues are not always found in
the same person, and rarely in anything approaching the
same
degree of intensity.
a

Nevertheless,
to

play

it

seems to me

in the current

that historical studies have

a

toward empirical in
always been adequately ap

movement

and that this role has not
preciated. In making this observation, I am not simply
viewing with alarm the current state of scholarship in
American legal history. Of course, the field is and has been

quiry

neglected; but a reasonable amount of very good work is
being done, and there are favorable auguries for healthy
development in the future. Nor should I be understood as
saying that the study oflegal history can be justified only by
its contributions to empirical inquiry into contemporary
problems. No doubt, history, like Emerson's Rhodora, pro
vides its own excuse for being. It may be essential to the
"humane study of the law," as Boorstin would have it. And
it has contributions

to

make

doctrinal,

to

as

well

as

other

of, scholarly endeavor.

sorts

But it is the relations between historical and "fact" re
search that I wish to assay. Presumably, the general object of
systematic examination of legal institutions and legal proc
esses is to derive understanding. But most research in the

law
use,

contemplates
and this

use

that such

understanding shall be put to
intelligent modification of

may often be the

existing institutions, processes, and doctrine. It is my con
tention that, in many instances, the attainment of these ob
jectives is assisted and advanced by competent historical in
quiry and that, clearly, the construction of any general the
ory of institutions is not possible without very considerable
research into extensive historical sequences, along with

much else.

considering some of the reasons for this, I should per
haps begin with a truism. Most would agree that, ordi
narily, intelligent fundamental modification of institutional
arrangements requires the grasp of some useful general no
In

tions of institutional behavior and

of what the

a

great deal of under

institution is and does. And

standing
particular
understanding of what any particular institution is requires
knowledge of how it has become what it is. Perhaps most of
what I shall say is really summarized in this formulation:
But the statement is

ful

or

7

the understanding and solution of contemporary prob
lems. This is true both with reference to the ordinary func
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too

general to

be either very

meaning

functioning of institutions and with reference to
the effects of various measures impinging on the operation
of institutions and processes. This proliferation of data pro

vides a stimulus to the imagination when making provision
for the problems of the future. It may, for example, permit
the legislative draftsman to avoid "forgetting something"
vital when he undertakes to order or influence the future.
Third, history frequently throws light on what will and
what will not work. It frequently suggests something of the
price that must be paid in countervailing values. Can it be
doubted that a really competent modern account of that

great (if not noble) experiment, Prohibition, would have
much of value to teach as to contemporary problems of
social policy and the mechanisms of social control within
the legal order? And should one doubt the significance of
the element of recurrence in historical development, let him
compare the

problems

of the Thames waterfront in the
as described
by

years of the eighteenth century,
Radzinowicz in the second volume of his

closing

evolving history

of English criminal law, with the conditions of the New
York waterfront in the 1940'S and 1950'S.
Fourth, historical research (to state an apparent paradox)
is often required to overthrow the dead hand of tradition.
To express the thought differently, history needs writing to
correct false notions of history and the social
consequences
of such notions. No matter is of greater importance to the
law reformer, or any other apostle of change, than the cur
rently accepted historical image of the institution, arrange
ment, or process which he seeks to alter. This is true whether
he be concerned with the jury, the privilege against self
incrimination, the elected judiciary, or the use of the seal in
real estate transactions. As Morris Cohen well said, inertia is
the first law of social change, as it is of physics. In the social
arena the sanctification of existing institutions is the mecha
nism of inertia. No claim need be made that the competent
writing of history will often, by its own force, guarantee
the achievement of that which is needful. But it can and
should be asserted that historical research ma y clear the
ground for, and render more nearly possible, the rational
and intelligent discussion of what is required to be done.
N or is it the point that historical research is only an instru
ment of change. For, as Julius Goebel has properly observed,
it has lessons to teach as to what are the essentials of the
tradition worth preserving as well as to what may sensibly)
be abandoned or altered.
Fifth, history serves to keep alive insights and proposals
of the past which tend to be lost in oblivion. This is a wast
age of intellectual assets we can ill afford. The lack of con
tinuity relating the work of one investigator to that of an
other, and the loss thereby occasioned, has frequently been
noted in the social disciplines, including non-doctrinal work
in the law. I suggest this discontinuity also separates the

persuasive.

Second, history

expands

the range of basic data relevant
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work of the

generations. That the problem
Who has

trivial

is real may be

illustrated by
experienced
example.
the shock of discovering (sometimes by accident) that his
"new" idea was being discussed in the law reviews twenty
five or thirty years ago? Again, an interesting contrast is
provided by the continuing influence of the Benthamite re
formers in England and the comparative absence of influ
ence, in this country, of such innovators as Livingston. I
suspect that a complete explanation would take into account
the differences in the character and extent of historical en
a

deavor in the

two

not

countries.

Sixth, history works economy in another

sense.

Any

ma

pre
jor proposal for law reform is likely to involve
liminary historical investigation, however unsystematic,
some

simply because it is obviously indispensable. Such efforts are
usually inadequate because of the labors involved in collect
ing relevant, but widely scattered, materials. Competent
histories which collect and systematize the source materials
ease these labors and
go far to insure consideration of the
proposal on a broader base of information and 'insight.
The foregoing observations, of course, do not in any
sense exhaust the
subject. There is an obverse side to this
discussion. For the insights and techniques derived from
empirical studies of current problems may often be of the
greatest utility in historical research. Indeed, in many areas
they have contributed wholly new conceptions of what is
relevant and meaningful for historical study. Thus, the

Kinsey studies, for all their methodological vagaries, and
despite the sheer perversity and wrongheadedness that un
doubtedly characterize the work, produced insights which
are
genuine and of continuing value. No subsequent studies
of the history and development of American family rela
tions or the regulation of sexual conduct will be able wholly
to avoid taking them into account. Two generations of in
vestigation into the relations of economic interest to politi
cal theory and thirty years of speculation as to the psycho
logical underpinnings of judicial behavior have eliminated
at least the excuse for production of a biography like Bever
idge's magnificent and magnificently naive Life of Marshall.
Moreover, "fact" research in its descriptive aspects often
provides a base line from which subsequent change and
modification may one day be measured by the future his
torian with a degree of accuracy never attainable heretofore.
Indeed, the

state

crime surveys of the twenties and thirties

and the Wickersham

Report of the

limitations,

disappointing

same

already,

are
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be won. In making this effort, we shall be wise not to
overlook the contributions which historical study can
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